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TH£ CLOAK AND THE DAGGER
An Essay on the Relative Importance of, and
Interaction between. "Ideology" and "Power"
in Contemporary World Politics
I. Introduction
a. global sayffrtff
World politics are marked by a restless universal unwillingness
to tolerate the notion of political normality as vast military confrontations
and their concomitant chaotic conditions mar the international scene.
The disorderly nature and frequent near paralysis of world politics, epito-
mised by the absence of a meaningful dialogue in Vietnam as this is being
written, has increased tensions to unprecedented heights.
While the two dominant powers, armed with thermonuclear missiles
and divided by competing Ideologies, are continually struggling for a world
In which their respective values can prevail, another struggle, between
former colonial powers and the culture they represent on the one hand and
the vanguards of colonial emancipation on the other, has enlarged the
scope and intensity of the world conflict. Communist China has been much
more than an eager witness to the contest. The emergence of a Chinese
nuclear capability presents the dilemma of a future nuclear confrontation
in Asia as well as in Europe. This, in brief, is the setting of contempo-
rary world politics. No nation today is immune from the danger of nuclear
devastation or secure from political and ideological penetration.
1

This essay is planned around two entangled concepts of contempo-
rary world politics—ideology tnd power. Attention is focused on both the
actions (foreign policy) and interactions (international politics) of selected
nation-states, discussed both individually and collectively. Power and
ideology are treated as forces which cut across and operate within these
units. This level has been chosen as the primary level of analysis because
ideologies enter into the political process through state governmental organ-
isations, and states normally monopolize the legitimate use of power within
the established geographic limits of their respective jurisdictions.
The first section of this paper is devoted to capsuled descriptions
of the phenomena generally associated with the terms 'ideology" and
"power. " Such inquisitorial investigation of these illusive concepts appears
imperative before attempting to link them subsequently with their political
environment. Next, three macro models are constructed as "ideal types"
for purposes of comparison and making generalizations about possible rela-
tions among polity, power, and ideology in diverse societies. These models
stress the domestic functions of ideology, and the ideological motivations
underlying the pursuit of power. Then, departing from the abstract realm,
wa apply our "ideal type" conceptualisations In determining how significant
states utilise power and ideology in international relations. Our primary
interest lies in the degrees to which Ideology and power affect the formula-
tion of a state* s foreign policy and the resulting implications for international
politics. And ultimately, a summation is made and conclusions drawn about
the hypotheses that have been posited throughout the essay.

This broadly eclectic approach la predicated on three basic
assumption*:
1. The roles of ideology and power in international politics cannot
be understood without comprehending also their roles in the
domestic and foreign policies of states.
2. Understanding these latter roles and how they Interact requires,
as a minimum, an understanding of the relevant social and
political environment of states*
3. The relative importance of* and interaction between, ideology
and power varies from society to society according to the stage
of modernization and the political formulae current therein and
their compatibility therewith.
Both the dominant ideology of a society and the power available to a
society determine, and are determined by, its political formulae. Therefore
power and ideology should be analysed by a scheme Identifying the relevant
political actors, the political arena, the orientations and Ideologies of the
actors, and the relationship of all these to the underlying system which
defines the politics of the society.

II. The Nature erf Ideology and Power
A, Xtoe Cloa fr
Only in a world In upheaval* in which fundamental new values are
being created and old ones destroyed* can intellectual conflict go
so far that antagonists will seek to annihilate not merely the
specific beliefs and attitudes of one another* but also the intel-
lectual foundations upon which these beliefs and attitudes rest, i
To understand 'ideologies'*—what they are* what gives rise to
them* and how they function—we will explore in this section their signifi-
cant features as laid down by social theorists who have had something
pertinent to say about them.
Whet Are Ideologies V
An Ideology may be simply defined as a more or less logically
coordinated set of beliefs* doctrines, and appeals advanced by a political
actor and oriented about some of the problems of the nation-state* The
negative components within ail ideologies are usually concerned with the
elimination of certain iniquities of society* while on the positive side is
the perhaps Utopian dream of establishing the good humane type ox society
once evil has been eliminated.
What gives m$ to Tftfm?
Karl Mannheim traced in Ideology and Utopia the historical
process by which the concept of Ideology evolved as a segment of the
very subject matter to which it referred. Mannheim* s asseveration that
1
Kari Mannheim, Uteojpgy SjmJ Utopia (New York: Earcourt,
Erace, 1935). p. 04,

"the significant element in the conception of ideology . . . is the discovery
2
that political thought is integrally bound up with social life" makes explicit
the thesis in his sociology of Knowledge. This is also the official line of
Karl Marx* who is generally credited with giving the greatest impetus to
ideology as a means of translating ideas into action* principally through the
criticism of extant society* The great ambition of Marx was to "rid the
3
present of the past,
"
Because ideologies may often be used for the maintenance and pro*
taction of the systems of political power which they eulogize, Mannheim
4
stressed their conservative traits. To him, ideologies presupposed false
consciousness and when espoused were already being bypassed by history.
Juxtaposed to this view is his conception of the Utopian mentality of the
radical who ignores what exists to posit something that "is not and never
will be." The Utopian consciousness is right in its general direction of
s
change* but wrong in predicting what will be brought about* ** Mannheimian
ideologies'' therefore are posited to protect the power of declining groups}
"Utopias" are located in the ideals of the rising classes.
Another popular approach, somewhat divergent from the Marx*
Mannheim "social class" idea, stresses societal stages of Intellectual
growth or modernization, ideological fervor being characteristic of the early
phases oi the process. Max Weber followed this second approach in positing
., p. 125.
Cf • Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, I960), p. 370.
Mannheim, 9EUJ2&*» P» 4 $»
4bld. . p. 192,

hi* throe types of authority—traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal.
7 d
Other writers such as Erich Fromm and Daniel Bell argue that as industrial
societies become increasingly diversified, complex* and affluent, ideologi-
cal rigidity is undermined* and ideological claims become more and more
difficult to justify by the elite. Such arguments are frequently made with
regard to the Soviet Union and also to explain "the &nd of ideology" in
Western nations.
The predominant approaches in explaining the social determinants
of political Ideologies are the "strain theoryn and the "interest theory"
which may often overlap as men try to escape anxiety while pursuing per-
sonal advantage. According to the strain theory, when persons are dis-
satisfied with their social arrangements, frustrations begin to build; hut
instead of directing their anger toward the source of their discontent, their
aggressiveness is rechanneled—a sublimation if you will—into a more
acceptable form of fierce devotion to an ideology. The strain theory may
account for the rise of Nazilsm after World War 1 and for the support of
French and Italian Communist Parties today.
Cf . Leonard Binder, "Ideological Foundations of Egyptian-Arab
Nationalism" in David Apter (ed.), toojogy ftM Pjjscpitien! (London:
Collier-Mac nillan, Ltd., 1964), pp. 150-51, for inadequacy of both these
approaches in explaining nineteenth century European nationalism.
7
£rich Fromm, MftY MM ftmti ? An inquiry tflftp Ifte Fqcfrs ajnd
Fictions of Foreign Policy (Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1964),
pp. 67-85.
8Bell. op,, cjt., pp. 374-75.
9Cf. K. H. Silvert, fftpeclftnt faopifff i flfatiftftflUfitift #fi^i flfVttoMMMt
(New York: Random House, 1963), p. 441* "In complex developed and mature
societies the push toward high orders of complexity and international inter-




"Clifford Geerts, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in Apte.-\ op. cit ..
pp. 52-57.

7In the interest theory, men are driven to their actions primarily by
a desire for power, but conceal this crass "id" desire in the "superego"
terminology of ideology, which serves, not only as a salve to the conscience
of the proponents of an ideology* but as an attractive device to ensnare
11
others. Thus, ideology has the effect of legitimising, extending, and
building the power of the system* Stalinist totalitarianism epitomized
"interest theory" ideology.
A FVttlrUonaA Appro^c^
Three broad meanings of "ideology" are outlined below in an
attempt to ascribe function to the term in the functionally integrated social
12
system. These areas of functional specificity are designated as value
structure, tension-managing device, and an instrument to conceal reality.
(1) Ideology as Value Structure
Although the term 'ideology" usually has a pejorative meaning in
the prevalent American usage, many contemporary authors have been using
13
it in a more generous light to denote simply a "system of ideas, " "a value
Ci • Hans J. Morgenthau, "Power and Ideology in International
Politics" in James Rosenau, I^erna^^na^ PflUUfffr anfl fore^n, foUpy (New
York: The Free Press of Olencoe, 1961), p. 173. "It is the very nature
of politics to compel the actor on the political scene to use ideologies
in order to disguise the immediate goal of his action. The immediate goal
of political action is power.
"
12
Cf. Apter, op. cit., Introduction, p. 13: *\ . . ideology helps
to perlona two main functions: one directly social, binding the community
together, and the other individual, organising the role personalities of the
maturing individual. These functions combine to legitimatize authority."
UFromm, op. c,jjt t , p. 121.

14
system, " or "a set of values and attitudes oriented about the problems
IS
of the state. " Raymond Aron has said that "in the twentieth century,
16
a great power weakens Itself if it refuses to serve en idea* " Viewed in
this neutral light concerning its reality content* ideology functions as a
value structure, a source of norms "to organise the role personalities of
17
maturing individuals"; to justify the societal division of labor; and to
condition the style of leadership* tn a Mn»e this usage blurs the distinc-
tion between ideology and morality. Ideology, thus used, also enables us
to see more clearly how it legitimizes the use of power, transforming it into
authority and, thereby, revealing the political significance of power. Hence
we are able to speak of an American Ideology or, possibly, to undertake more
fruitful analysis of the current Soviet ideology*
Also of importance is the role of ideology as value structure in
determining "human will. Will may be manifested as determination,
resolve, fear, or Indifference, but in any event it is crucial to the use of
power in accomplishing national objectives. Will depends on the particular
objectives and values of the state in question) ideology may, of course.
' Seymour Martin Upset. foMtt9fl MMt Ihf flogM foaej <*E
Politics (Garden City, N.Y,: Doubleday and Co* , Inc., I960), pp. 389~
417.
SSamuel P. Huntington, ffftc. Mf^ef $nti tfrffi fiffie, tfo? Theory
EM fWttci <4 CivU-Mttltary ftlrtfttflflf (New York: Random House, 1957),
p. 90.
16
Raymond Aron, "Quest for a Philosophy** in Stanley Hoffman (ed.),
gWteroPor»*Y Hkwm Aft Utomttmti, M*U<M9 (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.t
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 91.
17
Apter, loc. clt .

establish both values and objectives. In this respect Ideology may
stiffen American resolve to overcome the psychological fact of "cold-war
battle fatigue."
(2) Ideology as Tension-Managing Device
The use of ideology as a tension-managing device is probably
the closest of the three functions to the Marx-Mannheim usage. Status
ambitious or threatened groups, often in an incipient!y dysfunctional
society, experience psychological tension as explained in the strain theory
above. This social and psychological role of Ideology, as distinct from
its social determinants, reveals ways of dealing with the disturbances that
cause the "strains. 1* Ideology functions to bridge the gap between the pre-
vailing limits of reason and the psychological needs of man within society,
and as a safety-valve to release emotional tension onto symbolic enemies
such as "The Bourgeoisie" or "The Jews. * Such symbols may be used as
social cement to knit a class or group together. Erich Fromm refers to the
ISdynamic concept of ideology Mto articulate the deepest longings of man,
dispelling strains by bringing them into the public notice to make continued
neglect more difficult* And finally, Eric Hoffer speaks of Ideologies that
"ripen a person for self-sacrifice" by stripping him of *his individual
identity and distinctness through his complete assimilation into a
20
collective body. Thus, on a usually unconscious level, the individual
i8
Richaid C. Bowman, "National Policy in the War of Wills,
"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol, 91, No, 4, Whole No, 746,
April 19o5, p. 47.
19
Fromm, op. eft., p. 122.
20
Eric Hoffer, Tfrff Tttt«. ftaUfYfTi .ThffWhlf Ptt tte NfttMft Of MW
Movement (New York: Harper & Row, 19S3), p. bO.

10
balances his otherwise continual state of anxiety by the acceptance of an
ideology—even though tne Ideology Itself might bring chaos*
(3) Ideology as an Instrument to Cloak Reality
Mannheim* in dealing with man's efforts to use or distort ideologies
for political ends* distinguished between the "particular8 conception of
ideology (the cloak) denoting skepticism "of the ideas and representations
advanced by our opponent . • . the mora or less conscious disguises of the
real nature of a situation* " and the "total" conception referring to the
21ideology of a "concrete historico-social group. ' The essence of an
ideology is that its propositions are advanced by an advocate and therefore
may easily be transformed into propaganda; for this reason ideology has
become a pejorative term.
Talcott ?^xions observes that evaluative processes axe responsible
for "selectivity" (an unbalanced account of available truth) and often 'out-
right distortion* " both in stating the case of the proponents and in attacking
22
that of the opponents. "It is typical that the former are pictured as moti-
vated by the highest of idealistic motives* while the latter are guided by the
23
grossest form of self-interest."
Eric Heifer has argued that contemporary times are the age of the
"true believer* " where "mass man" is in the center of the political process
21
*Mannheim, op. clt .. p. 56.
HTalcott Parsons. "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in
Social Process" in Harry Eckstein (ed.). Internal war (New York: The Free




and bis ideological manner of thinking has become an integral part of the
24
international system. To influence a mass audience, an ideology mutt
be identifiable by the people and, therefore, must simplify ideas, establish
a claim to truth* and, in the union of the two, demand a commitment to
25
action* " Only then is it competent to arouse the passions in people and
thereby channelise emotional energy into political power where it becomes
especially relevant to this discussion*
An ideology may be a sincere belief and/or a tool for political gain;
it may serve psychological as well as political med&i and it may stabilise,
unite, or divide. From this general analysis om might expect a predominantly
ideological approach to the conduct of international relations to be determin-
istic and doctrinaire, to contain moral overtones and emotional commitment,
and to oe antagonistic to compromise and harmony, Rigid monocarpic
Ideologies do not long endure the ravishes of time. World politics neces-
sitate that an ideology also remain faithful to the policy-makers, who,
through reasonable dialogue instead of continual crisis bargaining with
states of opposing belief systems, will transform an ideology to meet new
demands imposed by a constantly changing world society* Policy cannot
long consist of ideological rhetoric that refuses the indispensable, patient,
and tiresome negotiations which are the only efficacious means to peace
and normality.
24
Hoffer, op, cttf . P»ff$lP«
^ell, op. clt *. p. 377. Cf. Hoffer, op* cit. » p, 18. "So, too,
an effective doctrine: as well as being a source of power, it must also claim
to be a key to the book of the future.
"

uPower 18 one of the key concepts involved in ell political phenomena
and especially in contemporary world politics. However, it is also an analyti-
cal concept on which there is a notable lack of consensus, both about its
specific definition, and about many features of the context in which it should
be placed, such as the "balance of power,** There is apparent agreement that
the core of its meaning involves the capacity "to get something done. " As
used herein power is the capacity to control in one* s interest the behavior or
decisions of others* including especially the capacity to affect adversely
their interests.
TfoP FtoEe^ajc VK*w
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for
power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics,
power is always the immediate aim, 26
Hans Morgenthau** "realist" theory of international politics, based
on the thesis that "power politics" is synonymous with politics, is one of
the prevailing approaches to an understanding of international relations.
The concept of interest defined in terms of power provides power with
paramount significance in drafting foreign policy.
"Power politics" is generally considered as implying that the fore-
most goal of each state is the maximisation of power with minimum or no
regard for legal and moral obligations. The most basic common objective is
preservation and improvement of the state's power position in relation to
other states. Morgenthau concedes, however, that moral restraints do
>6Kans J, Morgenthau, Pojlttffft AvlQflS IfattQflSi. Ui9 9UMtgqk JW




operate upon the use of national power. Such a point of departure gives
perfunctory attention to the role of ideology in world politics, restricting
it to the masking of power motives.
Political behavior in contemporary world politics is not shaped
merely by power struggle as in the narrow* traditional connotation of power
politics. though force remains "the final arbitre of rivalries among
nations, " and* certainly* power considerations are of primary importance
in the formulation of foreign policy*
National power is the major criterion used in measuring the nature
and extent of a state's capacity to achieve the goals deemed advantageous
to itself* National aspirations can be achieved only to the extent that they
are reinforced by power—military, economic, intellectual, and moral.
The constituent elements of a nation's power may be viewed as a
combination of its tangible and intangible resources. The physical
resources should include as a minimum a country' s population, manpower,
military establishment, Industrial productivity, agricultural means,
geographic size and location, and natural resource endowments* Add to
these such psychological factors as its international strategic situation,
national morale, level of education and technology, and social, economic,
27
Ibld* . p. 234,
2£
Cf . Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-
Making. M ftpf Igm&lVf W^> XV (August. 1953). 397-98. "A demo-
cratic society recognises the validity of a variety of motivations. * . .
The power motivation is obscured; its demands must constantly be com-
promised with the requirements of other motivations, equally valid in a
democracy, and when these other motivations happen to contradict the




and political structure. Resource* of dependable alliance partners might
also be Included. Availability, convertibility, and potential growth must
be considered in relation to each of these physical and metaphysical
qualities. Moreover, most of these assets are not subject to direct
measurement, but must be evaluated.
The structuralist view of resources being manipulated by various
power factions stresses rigidity and necessity and the hierarchical aspects
of power systems, rather than the freedom of power. These resources are
important only in situations where they can be utilized effectively; in this
sense power must be deployable* The advent of thermonuclear weapons has
emphasized the importance of immediately available power as opposed to
potential power.
Power may also be used as dominion—a relationship of inequality
among states where power is exercised through direct political control of
subject peoples, irrespective of motives. The Soviet Union still seeks to
play that role in parts of eastern Europe—but its dominance over its
satellites is inevitably weakening.
Power must be measured not only by the possession of strength
in resources* but by the utilization of that strength. The empirical
evidence of power used as an instrument to produce an intended effect is
the accomplishment of the objective in question. This instrumentalist
view is of power as being flexible and goal-oriented, of political leaders
exercising power by applying their values and Ideologies to the processes
of policy-making in the achievement of other values, which might other-
wise not be obtained.

15
II the intention of the political actor who threatens or actually
uses the power is made the central criterion for analysis* the primary
instrumental uses of power may be described as deterrence from unaccept-
able acts and punitive measures for acts actually committed. Of these
instrumental uses of power the moat important, the most efficient, and by
far the most frequently used is power as deterrent. The deterrent effect
Is relative to the amount of power being held in check and also to the incen-
tives to action or aggression residing behind that power. Its true value can
be measured only by the response of those against whom such power is
directed—are they cognizant of such deterrent power, and has their reaction
to it been the desired one: Ultimately, the United States deterrent power
over the Soviet Union and China depends on holding their cities as "hostages, "
and of course they are aware of this. Deterrence then is bargaining power—
a psychological and political posture.
Power restraints may be imposed (a) by the nature of the situation.
iPor instance, only if military force is commensurate with the provocation
will successful deterrence be accomplished* Therefore, force must be
regulated, and the military must accept restraints.) Or* (b) restraints may
spring from the internal value system or ideology of the states involved in
29
the power relationship. A nation's unique constitutional processes also
limit its power by determining the resources placed at the disposal of the
foreign policy-maker. Although the United States has often b&m called
"the arsenal of democracy, its power is subject to numerous restraints*
29
Cf. Paul Nitase, " Necessary and Sufficient Elements of a General
Theory of International Relations** in William T. H. Fox (c*d.), theoretical
AiPtfftff <rf ImWfrUpna] MffmfrftJ (Notre Dame. Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1959), p. 12.

16
such as the liberal culture stressing the morel aspects of power, the
necessary considerations of numerous allies, and world opinion.
%m Qmn far fmm
in their quest for power, nations may be classified, according to
their purposes* into three groups corresponding to money-seekers in a
30
market economy. The first group, the bereft, must endure great sacrifice
merely to attain enough power to satisfy their most urgent national needs.
This grouping includes the vast majority of underdeveloped nations in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America today. A second group, the affluent, are
skillful and/or fortunate enough to have sufficient power to achieve their
specific goals and still maintain a unest egg" of additional power not
immediately xm&ded in the furtherance of national objectives. This group
is most likely to contain the status quo powers, the United States, most
of Western Europe, Japan, and members of the British Commonwealth, The
final group, the misers, develop an insatiable lust for power because it has
become a value in itself; a pathological urge pushes the nation to enormous
exertions and exorbitant demands on others. Best fitted to this category
appear to be the Communist states, in particular the Soviet Union and China;
the latter is not included in the bereft nations grouping, simply because of




Arnold Wolfers, fflsffora; Wrf fiOlUlftfrOTtiviai SiffY« Qfl
International Politics (Baltimore; The Tohns Hopkins Press. 1962). p. 106.
"The quest for influence or power is as universal in the international arena




In summary, ideology interacts with power in several significant
ways. It may legitimize and structure the use of power, strengthen (or
enervate) will power, increase or decrease prestige, and conceal the true
motives of those struggling for power. It m*y, on the one hand, be used
as a hasis for the national inter©; t in the positive sense, imparting to it
meaning* purpose, and direction. Or, on the other hand, ideology ruay he
used as a rationalisation tot the use of power in the negative *wm. In
either case it provides a measure of cohesive rationale for internal order
as well m for external action. It is the apparent relationship between
ideology, power, ami naUoml interest that is most Interesting to inter**
national relations and most appropriate to this discussion.

ii
IH. Setting the Stage
This essay develops a theoretical framework to show relationships
between ideology and power in world politics* The "ideal types" drawn
endeavor to encompass three principal groups o! national actors on the
world stage. No particular effort has been made to fit everything that comes
along} it is believed* however, that the process of selection is such that
the clusters do not distort the picture.
The implicit assumption here is that global society* though composed
of numerous disparate societies or nations* may be viewed for purposes of
analysing ideology and power by comparing clusters of nations that have
certain features in common. The "pie has been cut" according to what we
are attempting to analyze; the relative importance of ideology and power.
A. Tfae Mfrtnli ftem^fftflc
The first theoretical construct is a macro model of a functionally
integrated social system prevalent in a modern mass-industrialised liberal
democracy. This pluralist society exhibits, using S. E. Finer' s terminology,
a "mature political culture" because there is a strong and widespread consen-
sus covering the constitution and legitimacy of the sovereign authority and
31
a corresponding belief that no other center of power is legitimate. It
extends also to approval of the procedures for transferring this power. The
government is sustained by strong sentiments; well disciplined social groups
51
S. E. Finer, Tftfi Mill m JHQfffifrfrftofoi tim M« fld thf MMWY iff





and firmly established civil procedures and Institutions enable it to weather
adversity and pursue consistent policies. Domestic policy is determined by
persuasion and compromise as opposed to force and coercion.
Foreign policy is influenced by the existing or predicted will of
the people. Governmental leaders, who actually determine policy, must
stand for competitive election and, as a result, tend to share common
values with the people.
The status of the constitutional foundation of the governing author-
ity is legitimised by the belief system of the society-"ideology functioning
primarily as value structure. This ideology Is liberalism. Generalising
about its content as it appears today may be a hazardous endeavor. Liberal-
ism in a given country is conditioned by the character of its prevailing form
of government. There is probably no condensed version of liberal principles-
a "liberal catechism"—as such; however, at a fairly consistent philosophy,
liberalism has become synonymous with personal fulfillment, self-
expression, moral dignity, progress through reason, and democracy prac-
ticed through guaranteed rights and popular participation) it opposes forms
of authority considered restrictive of Individual freedom and social progress,
such as censorship barriers limiting free expression of opinion, Individual-
Ism is its basic tenet and its ultimate objective is the maximum satisfaction
of the Individual's needs and aspirations.
Power is not very attractive to the liberal . According to Samuel
Huntington, "liberalism normally either denies the existence of power,
32
minimizes its importance, or castigates it as inherently evil." The
liberal, while he may respect a great amalgamation of power, seeks to
32
KunUngton, ^ag^cit,. p. 90,

20
impose restraints on power end prefers that national security and peace be
attained through legalistic and moral devices, such as international organ*
isations. The "power games" of states are viewed through the liberal's
ideological lenses as being useless in solving the world* s major problems
and as inhuman interference with the lives of ordinary people. The humani-
tarian pacifist current in liberal thought is strong} but the liberal will
normally support wars waged on behalf of liberal ideals, Robert Osgood
states that power in a liberal democracy, if it is to protect national interests
and extend its values to others, must serve three functions: Hdeter[ring]
aggression; if deterrence fails, it must defeat aggression by means suffi-
ciently limited to serve political ends; and it must support national policy
33by means short of war* H
Liberal democracies today have fortunately attained sufficient
deterrent power to satisfy such vital goals as preserving their freedom and
34
prosperity, and they bUXI maintain a reserve for future contingencies.
However, even the strongest of states may no longer have the power avail-
able to manage events beyond their borders.
B. Xfte ggmjm/nM ?|a.tff M94*\
There are definite limits to the clarification to be derived from
generalisations about the Communist world and the roles of ideology and
power within it. It is obvious that the once monolithic Communist bloc is
33
Robert Osgood, MThe Uses of Military Power in the Cold War* in
Robert A. Goldwm (ed.). ftMUlff* ftffWli fitMY* vtt Vhttftti $tat«» Mim«iY
Policy (Chicago: Rand MoNally & Co., 19 63), pp. 1-2.
There Is obviously a tremendous national power differential
between the United States and the other nations subsumed under this model.
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in political disarray and that Communism has divers© meanings and functions
in its several environmental encampments. These settings may be divided
according to the origins of the Communist states into (1) the Soviet Union,
the sui generis state; (2) the East European satellites, which received the
"word" from Soviet "armed missionaries"! and (3) Communist China, North
Vietnam, and Cuba where Communist Parties came to power as a result of
their own efforts. Another major distinction, easily discerned within the
Communist world, is in the vast differences in industrialization and its
concomitant national power of the states. The rate of philosophical ferment
outside the porous Iron Curtain is bound to differ with the manifold degrees
of industrialization and the state* s needs for the ideology. With this caveat
in mind it is still not a difficult task to find obviously common elements
among the Communist states.
The "ideal type" to be delineated is that of a modem mass-
industrialized quasi-totalitarian society. The syndrome of usually acknowl-
edged traits of such societies includes a single disciplined mass party* run
typically from the top by one man, a more or less terroristic police (although
capricious and arbitrary terror have ceased to be a prime method of govern-
ance), a centrally directed and controlled economy, an exclusive possession
of all means of effective mass communications, a monopoly of control of
all means of effective armed combat, and a chiliastic Ideology "consisting
of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence
to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere, at least
passively. "
3SZbigniew K. Brzezinski, Mao^y Mfl Ppw<frr jn $ov|ct PoUtics
(New York: Frederick A, Praeger, Inc., 1962), p, IS*

wThe "ideal type" Communist society possesses a highly developed,
yet not mature, political culture because the legitimacy of the procedures
for transferring political power is in dispute. However, the civil institu-
tions are inveterate establishments, public authorities are deep-rooted, and
the hierarchical society lias been welded Into firm associations as its
pluralism has increased. There is much political participation without
political power. Political opposition is by definition anti-party, and no
organised opposition is permitted either Inside or outside the party. There
is an apparent consensus that legitimacy resides in the ideological party*
The government rejects any concept of the separation of powers or of checks
and balances. Politics consists of the interplay of certain bureaucratic
institutions which supposedly always have converging* if not identical,
interests.
A Communist society is permeated with ideological orthodoxy.
Following Marxist thought, it teaches that man is a good rational being who
has been corrupted by evil institutions. "It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their existence which
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determines their consciousness. n Since man is regarded as the product
of his social experience, it follows that he may be manipulated for his own
good. The Marxist interpretation of human experience is one of continuing
struggle over various interests—domestic, national, social, economic, and
political—between exploiting classes and the proletariat, with all significant
events being determined by economic forces. This monistic view stresses
the ubiquity of conflict and the constant repetition of thesis, antithesis*
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and synthesis; even so, the predetermined course of history to the Marxist
is an upward progression. The state, until it "withers away, f will always
be the instrument of dominion, the domination of one class over another*
This is the visionary Communist conception of a monolithic one-world.
The Communist Party as "vanguard of the proletariat" must bo all
powerful} this power receives ideological reinforcement as ideology fosters
an insatiable lust for power, especially economic power, as a value in itself.
This power is essential because the Communist state is in a perpetual condi-
tion of animosity with capitalist states.
The concrete expression of the ideology is the regime's absorption
with advancing productive accomplishment at home and the nurturing of
continued Communist revolution abroad. Ideology functions primarily as a
outtress for upholding the vision of political developments, i.e., as value
structure, and secondarily as a propagandist instrument to conceal reality.
National development is a total phenomenon • . • involving
industrialisation, classes, values, economic and political
organisation, bureaucracy, Ideology systems, and inter-
national relations. 38
The so-called developing nations represent a wide continuum, with
varying problems occurring at each progression along the path to self-sustained
growth and industrial and political development* Since each particular nation
is, in many respects, unique, individual prognoses would have to be based
on an analysis of the localized operative forces. Nevertheless throughout
these regions there exist conspicuous analogy and common attributes. Where
there is a power vacuum, both idoology and power are of crucial importance
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511vert, op. eft .. Introduction, p. 32.
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to the internal dynamics of development*
By definition, developing nations have had to endure extreme hard-
ship and suffering merely to attain enough power to satisfy their moat urgent
needi. They are deeply suspicious of superior power for good historical
reasons* Most of the developing nations are in transition from a predomi-
nantly traditional colonial heritage. Their major problems are centered
around widespread hunger, poverty, illiteracy, and unending economic
crisis. They are desperately trying to mobilize properly the Investment
capital, the human skills, and the natural resources to sustain an increase
in the productivity of thair people. They also are seeking, amid a multi-
plicity of contemporary circumstances, effective political institutions
appropriate to life in the mid-twentieth century. M Politics almost invariably
tends to be crude, either nakedly authoritarian or noisily but somewhat
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ineffectively revolutionary. " If there is a generic political style it may
best be portrayed as a "fluctuating oligarchy" in that political power may
be held by varying groups of politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers.
Any ascendant group or party may customarily be coupled with and muster
its support from a charismatic or at least enterprising leader. Usually
these leaders have gleaned their popularity, not for the position they repre-
sent, but for what they have fought against. "The political party structure
also is almost always under great strain, driven by a growing social need
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for impersonalism and hampered by the continuing importance of charisma."
The material preconditions for the development of cohesive civil
associations are deficient; public adherence to the existing political insti-







earlier political processes* These factors, combined with a regime that
may often be thoroughly discredited, leave legitimacy a highly contestable
matter.
The thrust toward a new Ideology is a prime political fact in the
developing nations. Their political beliefs and ideas, though appearing in
a host of interesting variations, are nevertheless similar in their "theoreti-
cal content and practical application"; they may be subsumed under the
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heading of "modernizing nationalism. " This ideological hybrid is a com*
bination of nationalism and socialism; one is meaningless without the other.
The nationalist side of the coin is a collective admonition of
independence and nonalignment in international affairs, a defensive reaction
directed against any encroachments of the world powers. Its predominant
motivating lorce is the desire for increased national status and dignity on
the world scene* Although most nations do not strenuously oppose Communism
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nor accept the notion that it is something evil in itself, their ideology does
have a nationalist cutting edge against Communist interference.
The other side, socialism, is directed against the wealthy capital-
ist nations; its driving force is the desire for economic development* It
proclaims that developing nations want little or nothing to do with free
enterprise capitalism because of its proverbial infamous concomitant
imperialism. This does not, however, exclude covert dealings with
Nations
iX
Paul £. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.}« XM .tofffrlvllto* fflt tfr* PfVqlffrtffg
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 3-5.
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capitalist nations; ' politicians realise that foreign capital and other
external assistance Is of critical importance for developing their countries*
This, of course, cannot be proclaimed as part of an ideological program*
As in the case of Communism, the ideology of "modernizing
nationalism, " with its emphasis on unity &nd solidarity, may be particularly
useful in decreasing the power of internal political opposition* Ideological
justification lends legitimacy to politically motivated acts* The negative
aspects of the ideology, those stressing nationalism, are useful in divert-
ing attention from other embarrassing problems, and may also increase the
will of the people to endure continued sacrifices and dislocations. In sum,
ideology is a tension-managing device to ease the -'growing pains" of
developing nations.
We must now apply these models to the real world.
43 Silvert, op. cit ., p. 35. "Although the ideological content is
usually still strongly anti-imperialist in practice, the now security and





The roles of ideology and power make little sense without defining
the world political situation. Politics is noldea by global events; foreign
policy, the expression of politics, is a response to these events. To be
relevant this essay must emphasise the hard realities cf the modern world;
political reality consists, for purposes of empirical analysis, of power
struggles at two levels of intensity. At the upper level, the struggle engages
colossi of power which either through exigency or through intent reach out to
influence others. At the lower level, the struggle is for men's minds; the
virility and catholicity of Communism and liberal democracy are at stake.
Tids section will center on the foreign policies of the essential
national actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, plus an aspirant
to essentiality, Communist China. A collective entity, the developing
nations, has also been included because tnese areas are the battlefields
of our times. We shall try to find regularities in the behavior of these
nations for purposes of subsequent generalizations.
In the second half of the twentieth century almost every major
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international crisis has been spawned out of the dynamic process of social
mobilization occurring in the developing nations where more than a billion
human beings are involved in revolutionary movements designed to modernize
their societies. In each case—Vietnam (or Indochina). Suez, Lebanon, Cuba,
the Congo, Malaysia, Tibet, and so on—Communist and Western foreign
policies have interacted with policies of the modernizing nationalists.
Given the situation of political and ideological antagonism among the major
powers, and given the existence of these areas of powerlessness, the
Berlin is a notable exception.
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foreign policy of a great power must necessarily be concerned over what
others are doi rtg in the area. My thesis is basically this: Ideology has
not been a major reason for these crises; it has played only an indirect
role.
a. foretan, policies oj the vwiwm muvm
At a time whan the thrust toward ideological thinking is becoming
exhausted in the industrialised world, new ideologies, directly correlated
with gaining social, political, and economic power in the shortest possible
time span, are being fashioned and accepted with fervor in the developing
world. Their Importance in this crucial struggle for power was stressed
earlier from a domestic vantage point. We will now investigate the pre*
dominant foreign policy actions of the third world to discover the dynamics
involved and their relationship to power and ideology.
Developing nations, understandably concerned lest the Cold War
prove uncontrollable, have shown in the United Nations and elsewhere that
they are not Indifferent to the world struggle. Furthermore, they have
exhibited no particular diffidence in airing their views on all aspects of
world affairs. The typical modernising nationalist sentiment, rejecting the
ideologies of both East and West, has been expressed below by Tom Mboya,
Kenya's minister for economic planning and development. Repudiating former
colonial powers' attempts to manipulate his policies, he sounded a warn-
ing also against the threat of Communism to African freedom, saying:
Merely because Eastern countries have never had a colony in
Africa, this doesn't mean they have no cold war designs upon
Africa, we have made it clear we reject the ideology of
^ra Mboya, " Mboya' s Warning on Communism, " San Francisco
Chronicle. April 13, 1965, p. S.
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communism. It ift just not good enough for some people to go
around pretending everything from the East is for the good of
Africa and everyone from the East means well for Africa, *6
tie also admonished Communist states lest they ". . . be tempted to Impose
economic colonialism or neo-coloniaiism ..." and called on African party
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leaders to pursue a course of genuine nonalignment.
The Ideology of "modernizing nationalism" sustains its peoples
during the long travail necessary in the metamorphlc process from backward
lands to mighty nations. And, like most ideologies, it glorifies the attri-
butes and minimises the faults of its own followers, while placing the burden
of blame for lac* of fulfillment or slow progress on outside elements*
Especially does it tend to be moralistic toward what are perceived to be
"power plays" by the dominant nations, Yut it does not cast out the mote
in its own eye. Moralistic sentiments give way when underdeveloped nations
adopt policies of hegemony or territorial expansion. India and/or Pakistan,
Indonesia, and others, all engage in the same power politics about which
their Ideologies accuse and discredit the established nations.
The bereft nations use their minimal power to further their national
Interests in the international realm through the processes of the United
Nations and by taking advantage of great power rivalry . These two important
"strategies'4 are often used in combination and are mutually supportable.
Sydney Bailey has remarked that "it is not surprising that they
should place their hopes in the United Nations, which seeks to minimize the
role of national military power and that they should use the Organisation to
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promote the advancement of the needy parts of the world." Making the
4 6
Ibid. 47Ibid.
48Sydney Bailey, The W^^.Ntttfrnfr ft ^frft PftUUff** Cv*d>
(New York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1963), p. 19.
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United Nations a deoating society rather than an action agency for peace
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nes b»9n one avenue of this effective promotion. As a body the Afro-
Asian Group* constituting a majority of the membership* often controls the
vote in the General Assembly. Though not always in harmony, they have
consistently acted in concert on questions concerning the rapid dismantling
of the remaining vestiges of colonialism, and the arranging of large-scale
United Nations aid to the less developed parts of the world. 3 The United
Nations has become a medium in which aggregates of strength can be con*
structed by the weaker nations so that they can go far to compensate the
political dominance of stronger states.
One reason the major powers have acquiesced thus far Is that they
are attempting to recruit supporters everywhere. The United States, the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and other nations to a lesser degree, have
used foreign aid and technical assistance to exert influence wherever they
could, steadily Intensifying the East-West and Sino-Soviet competitions
for the favor of neutralist states. The emerging nations, in return, have
conducted themselves »o as to advance their own causes, often wooing one
side, then the other, inducing the powers to grant them the greatest possible
amount of aid and assistance.
Some United States Congressmen have complained publicly that
the most U.S. foreign aid goes to those needy countries with the most
Communists. The implication is that it seems to benefit a country to keep
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its Communist threat for its cash value* an alleged menace being easily
redeemable in U.S. support* This paradox of power serves to enforce Thomas
Scheiling*s insightful proposition that ". • .in bargaining* weakness may
be strength." 51
These opportunistic actions constitute a novel form of power politics*
possible only in an age where great-power rivalry and a military balance of
terror* inhibiting somewhat the great-power use of force* present the small
powers with more freedom of action. Their "blackmail of weakness" allows
them to promote their own interest and to enjoy an eminence which their
actual power does not justify. Whether this paradox can long survive is a
problem far afield from this discussion. However, the dominance of
national interest (power) considerations over ideological ones is unmistakable*
0. ffovjje* foye^n PoUffiy
Does the Soviet Union follow foreign policies formulated in the
traditional great power manner of realistic appraisal of individual situations
according to its national interests* or does it adhere strictly to dogmatic
ideological beliefs ? The most common answer to this relevant question is
that it follows an indeterminate combination of the two. While adhering in
general to this answer* the hypothesis posited here is that Ideology plays
its role primarily in undertakings at a level characterised by limited commit-
ment, meager risk* and a disposition (though usually masked) either to come
to terms or to concede to superior power. It is these ventures into "targets
of opportunity" which have kept American policy-makers extremely pre-
occupied.
SThomas Schelling. The gfrategy # Cpn^ct (New York: Oxford
University Press* 19o3), p. 52.
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By Marxist-Leninist definition, Communist expansion into an
area is not imperialist expansion; rather* today's Communist guerrillas,
like Stalin's troops before them, enter countries to shake off the rule of
iniquitous, historically condemned, no longer viable, political institutions.
The Soviet Union has this "political formula* available which equates
expansion with liberation, the Communist Party with the working class (the
essential population). To this extent then they are an ideological power,
they are a national power with an ideology that can be put into effect when
opportunity arises.
The economically advanced countries are too virile and vigorous
and prosperous for the Communists to seize by force or subversion. There-
fore* the Russians are addressing themselves to the less developed countries
to heighten the frustrations, complexities, and crosscurrents inherent in the
transition to modernisation. According to Walt Rostow, their tactics are
based on a judgment that, "unless communism manages to seize power during
the complex and difficult transition to modernization, a Communist takeover
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will prove impossible.'1 The ideological belief is that a successful Commu-
nist revolution must generally precede economic and social development.
The now fashionable practice of intervention by nations in the internal poli-
tics of other nations fits ideally- into the Soviet pattern of opportunism. One
of their favorite methods is to encourage exaggerated nationalism where it
serves their interests, as in Indonesia. Where there is disruptive conflict,
S3Communists acquire "presence, influence, and leverage.
^/V, W . Rostow, "The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics,





The rales played in the Greek civil war, the Korean War* the
Middle East, the civil war in Laos, the Congo, Cyprus, Cuba, Guinea,
and now Vietnam have been opportunistic, of relatively modest effort and
low priority, and planned in the hope of attaining profitable bonuses. When
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such plans go awry, the Soviets salvage what they can, and abandon ship.
Lest the Soviets are given more credit than they deserve, it must
be emphasised that they choose their targets carefully. Their policy is not
directly expansive; it embodies pragmatic exploitation of tensions. The
opportunity for subversion is provided because of a previous lack of correc-
tive action In the society concerned. The real enemy, more often than not,
may be a corrupt non-Communist regime, for instance that of Batista, Farouk,
Diem, and ad nauseum . Communist ideology plays only an indirect role
and is not the reason for arising crises. The reasons already exist.
The fact that danger crosses a frontier should cause us to
look at the conditions which attract the infiltrator in the first
place, which make him choose this country rather than another
as his target. $$
The Cuban revolution came first and then the Cuban Communism!
Although the Marxist doctrine falsely contends that Communism is
able to control environment, it has not been primarily the Soviet ideology
that has caused them to capitalize on the trouble spots of the world, but an
especial Soviet perception of, and sensitivity to, changing conditions within
unfulfilled areas, that makes them ripe for Communism.
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I am indebted to Lerche for the theory that Soviet foreign policy is operative
at three distinct levels of intensity—real security, prestige, and opportun-
ism. However, he denies the significance of ideology at all three levels.
"Thomas L. Hughes, "Making the World Safe for Diversity, "
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Soviet foreign policy, like that of moat states, Is oased primarily
on this sensitivity to environmental change. This means that it can be
analyzed in reactive terms rather than with reference to the well-advertised
provocative blueprint for world conquest. The ideological blueprint exists,
but it may be considered almost irrelevant if Soviets act according to their
situational analyses, using the blueprint merely to justify the use of force.
Today the Reelpolltlk of the Russians, whatever their ideologi-
cal proclamations, appears to be addressed as much to stabilization
as to conquest. • . • The menace of Russia under the Communists
has come to seem rather like the menace of Russia under the czars—
which is to say that it has come to seem a normal, rather than an
extraordinary, menace. 56
The Kremlin foreign policy has operated, and Is operating today,
simultaneously at several different levels of priority judgment. Top
priority moves, commonly enough, are almost invariabley involved with
<te*Enf* <U »U ffftflf <4 the setf-percelve^ Unm,ff41fftf fieffVtirttY of the Soviet
Union, especially along its Western frontier. Threats to this security,
whether real or imagined, have been dealt with in a very hostile manner and
under a decided burden of risk. When the Russians intervened in Hungary
in 1956, they acted almost solely in terms of the national interest, suppress-
ing the Hungarian uprising without fretting over consequences elsewhere.
Acutely aware of the Hungarian desire for national independence from Soviet
occupation, the Russians intervened essentially not to save Marxism-
Leninism—their ideological justification for the intervention—but to preserve
their super-empire. Ideology, of course, does set the national interest.
Louis J* Halle, "National Policy and Real Policy" in Howard R.
Swearer and Richard P. Longaker (eds.), Contemporary CofflffiwUfm; TftfQfy
and Practice (Belmont. Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1963), p. 226.
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Cf. Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Protracted Conflict" in Swearer and
Longaker, op. cit .. p. 223. "The slightest trespass of the Communist
frontier is deemed fraught with the risk of all-out war, M

The various Berlin crises—the blockade of 1943, the Wall affair
of 1961, and the latest harassment of air and highway traffic into the city
during the German Federal Republic parliamentary meetings there, point up
the Soviet fear of a rising powerful non-Communist German state. Of almost
equal intensity, however, have been the U-2 crisis In 19*^0 and the border
disputes with its growing Asian rival—Communist China. These crises have
in common, besides a high risk-level, the threat to the national security of
the Soviet Union. a The Kremlin, not unjustifiably, is worried over the
emergence of nuclear-armed powers on two frontiers. This can hardly be
traced to ideological motivations.
The intermediate plane of Soviet action is less easily discernible
and is reserved for the bulk of direct encounters with the United States,,
for conduct in the United Nations, and for policy with Red China. Obviously,
many Soviet policies are below the security threat crisis level, but are of
greater intensity than mere opportunism. It is apparent that there is no
serious hope of expansion in the United States, but the Soviet Union, as
one of the two dominant powers, is motivated strongly in its competition
with the U.S. Like Avis Rent-a-Car, "they are only second best* so they
must try harder, This contest is for prestige and world leadership, for the
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recognition that is their due as a global power. And a similar feeling
exists toweid Red China, as the "status *ee*et&" vie for Communist Juris-
diction. The competition imposes upon the Soviet Union a new need to
demonstrate to censorious Communist audiences that the Soviet Union is
not negligent in its revolutionary duty.
y
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We might also consider their reaction toward the United Nations.
The Soviets are not particularly interested in the United Nations, which to
them is just a world forum; small-state influence is out of all proportion
with their importance or their contributions. This* in part* accounts for
Soviet refusal to pay dues for certain operations of the UN* for the refusal
to be bound by majority decision in the UN. and for the frequent use of the
veto to protect its position. Soviets also "claim that all peacekeeping
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matters should be handled solely in the Security Council."
As we have shown, the Soviets have &n extremely strongly
developed sense of the decisive role of power. They play often on the
instrument of power in international politics, but at three distinct pitches—
the high pitch of national security, the medium range of "status seekers. "
and the low intensity of Ideological opportunism. The essence of this
fact is the intimate fusion of two things: a sense of power against a back-
ground of an ideological oeiief system which sustains the power.
Turning to the aspiring giant Red China, we see that its performance
on the instrument of power has an overriding effect of primitive percussion,
instead of the sensitivity and adroitness of the Russian Communists. China
has neither the range of power nor the foreign policy skill of the Soviet Union.
The essential difference between the two is that bereft China is more
ideologically driven than affluent Russia; and such motivation generates a
cruder, more fanatic foreign policy. A lack of worldly necessities should
logically indicate a materialist Chinese regime. However, like the develop*
lng nations, China uses its Ideology to mobilise its people for progress
'°Cleveland. sxujgU. p. 11.
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and sustain them in the deficiency of possessions and subsistence.
Chinese Communism is a domestic product, drawing its vitality from a
Maoistic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Used as an intellectual
frame of reference, the dogmatic core to which all thoughts and actions can
be referred* Chinese Ideology is characterized by its "mass line" and such
concomitant slogans as "great leap forward, " "thought reform, " and "the
spiritual A-bomb is more important than a material one."
The degree of absurdity to which ideology has penetrated Chinese
society can best be understood by a recount of why Chinese players did so
well in the recent World Ping-pong Championships. According to a Peking
broadcast, Chinese table tennis players achieved the ping-pong victories
by "studying and holding high the great Red Banner of Mao Tze-tung's thought,
laying emphasis on politics, and learning wholeheartedly from the Liberation
Army**!
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Such difference in intensities of ideology was not, however, the
prime cause of the epochal Sino-Soviet split. The quarrel as it developed,
according to fcdward Cranksbaw, was " . . . conducted in almost exclusively
ideological terms; but it is apparent that issues other than purely ideologl-
cal disputes are at stake. " There are familiar Ideological differences
easily discernible from phrases like "dogmatism for criminal obscurantism,
"revisionism" for betrayal of the revolution, and "frectlonallsm, " the deadly
£3




"Coach Mao and His Paddlers, " San Francisco Chronicle ,
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dispute cannot explain adequately the range and bitterness of the verbal
battle. Other major Issues involved are also explained by Crankshaw:
Between the Soviet Union and China there is a straightforward
conflict of power and prestige as between two great powers
bordering each other and growing mightily. • • . The ideologi-
cal differences are bound up with these basic facts, and, even
if Moscow and Peking could reach apparent ideological com*
promise* the movement would still be split. &4
In this conflict ideology is not the end, but the means] it is being
used by Russia and China as a weapon in the struggle. The struggle is
almost assuredly one between two neighboring powers for self-assertion.
&• VnAtfti ?t§fes foreign Mfcy
The great moral of contemporary liberalism is that an
ideology which cannot be translated into political action is
pointless* &s
No country is less isolationist than the United States. This is
not caused by a desire for dominion, although the United States is certainly
able to pursue power objectives, but by its role as leading power of the free
world in a period of pervasive turmoil. The U.S. has undertaken in its
foreign policy two broad tasks: (1) to provide "the major share of the
defense of free-world interests" against Communist aggression, and (2) to
furnish resources and technical assistance for the economic and political
development of the emerging nations.
These obligations require clear definition of foreign policy objec-
tives and of the fundamental principles of action consistent with these
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goals* A serious dilemma confronts any nation which must reconcile the
demands for national security under the exigent conditions of the Cold War
with the basic ideals of a liberal democratic state. The growing dependence
upon its massive military strength places special responsibility upon the
U.S. to handle this power with the utmost care and restraint* never losing
sight of the fact that military power is only a means to an end. never an end
in itself. Liberal principles prescribe that power and wars be eliminated by
universal observance of simple rules such as M non-Intervention" and "respect
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for sovereignty. Accordingly, the only valid reason for the use of
violence is to put down violence.
tt> CrtffH MWMffftBt
For the thre^ decades preceding this week there had been no inva-
sion or overt Intervention in Latin America by U.S. Marines* The landing
at Santo Domingo on April 23. 1965, was undoubtedly dictated by reasons
vital to our political interests, but it signified the obvious delimitation of
the liberal ideology as a fundamental guide to our foreign policy. In essence,
a direct military invasion is being practiced for political ends in contradic-
tion to an ideology with which we have identified ourselves* thus indicating
that extreme liberalism in foreign affairs is logically untenable. Since the
prime adversaries of the U.S. have Implacably revolutionary purposes of
encompassing the world. America cannot turn away from basic issues Just
because they involve conflict with liberal principles. Rather, the U.S.
compromises between the desirability and the feasibility of various alterna-
tives.
£7
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For example, the orthodox liberal argument, applied to the
apparently endemic civil wars now In fashion, decrees refraining from
intervening and recognising "fair play" even if it is against our Interests.
This moral-legal position uses the principle of sovereignty without con**
sidering the outcome, out political theory condemns as a distortion of
reality the moralist absolute that violence is evil under ell historical
circumstances. Indeterminate political situations, unclear circumstances,
and instances of friction initiated in response to internal conditions do
exist that lead to a violent discharge; our Declaration of Independence may
serve as a reminder. Often the problem of assigning responsibility Is an
impossible one* The opponents may both be right or both wrong, rather than
always "right" versus "wrong. There may be valid and sufficient reasons
why a peaceful solution cannot be reached*
Since many moralist critics make no allowance for the pursuit of
national interest, even for defense of our allies, the doctrine of non-
intervention Is contrary to reason and cannot be maintained as a general
rule. The interests of several countries may be affected by a civil war*
Intervention, as extra-legal action that is not always dependent on "right, "
becomes a possibility whenever there is war. We "paint ourselves into a
traditional corner** when we use American strength only in response to
another's aggression.
Another example of the contradictions imposed on the policy-maker
by liberal principles flows from the partitioning of Korea, Germany, and
Vietnam. In accordance with liberal tenets, the zones were originally
intended as condominiums to be unified at some later date by nonviolent
means. Under opposing ideologies it is virtually impossible to unify these
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countries by peaceful means, and whoever fires the first shot must be
labeled an aggressor. In order to intervene in protection of national
interest the United States must treat one partition as a sovereign nation
and construct the situation so that we arc always reacting to aggression.
Often it is no easiar to reconcile our national interest with our
foreign policy than it is to reconcile our ideology with our actions. Much
ambiguity surrounds the actual definitions of our Interest. For example*
our national Interest calls for no extension of Communist dominion.
Contrary to this interest, Tibet was annexed by China, we " sat on our
hands." The Chinese speed of action—a fait accompli, tremendous
potential cost of life by American Interference, a Tibet far removed from
our
M
sphere of influence, " and other such considerations were all factors
overriding American intervention in behalf of its own interest and in the
face of an aggressive act abhorred by liberal principles. Intervention
probably did not even receive serious consideration in Washington.
(a fofftfwm
Ideology is more compatible with the second task of our foreign
policy~~fumisiting aid to the developing world. The motivations for helping
these areas are mixed, but national interest is again dominant. On the one
hand, because of ideological (read moral) reasons Americans would want to
help these peoples progress even If there were no such thing as Communism.
Liberalism is concerned with equality of economic and political opportunity
and freedom from control « But there is another reason, echoed here by
Secretary of State Rusk: 'Our security is inextricably bound up with the
evolution of a world of independent peace-seeking nations. M There
uDean Rusk, "The Pursuit of Peace, Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. U, Ho. 1312, August 17, 19t>4, p. 432.
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cannot be stability in a world composed of a few who are rich and many who
are poor. In light of the global ideological and power struggle and the fact
that both major branches of the Communist world are concentrating their
efforts in the less developed areas, it is urgent that the United states assist
them in gaining a more abundant life so that they do not lose their freedom.
Has this analysis of liberalism and the use of power in U.S.
foreign policy, undertaken in the harsh light of reality, uncovered a betrayal
of our liberal tradition and revealed a power-oriented America 9 Such a
point of departure has been purposely taken to disclose the impossibility
of using undiluted liberal principles in the conduct of foreign policy*
Decision-makers at the highest levels of our government must be able to
react with appropriate strength, resolve, and restraint in handling global
crises, If the demands of national security are to be adequately fulfilled.
The American system operates through bargaining and compromise! Ideology
creates difficulties in responding to change, and undermines power. However,
In actual American foreign policy, power dilutes ideology. President Lyndon B.
Johnson, in his April 7, 1365, address to the peoples of the world and the
nation, justified the use of power In terms of American Ideology:
Wa fight because we must fight If we are to live in a world where
every country can shape its own destiny • • • the infirmities of
man are such that force must often precede reason . • . our
resources are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values
and a principle, rather than territories or colonies, our patience
and determination ar e unending. ... We dream of a world where
disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make
it so. ... I do not find . . . [power] . . . impressive. The guns
and bombs, the rockets and warships, are all symbols of human
failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish.
But they are witness to human folly. Q$
1965, p. 13,
-The President's Address, n San Francisco Chronicle. April 8,
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It is assuredly American ideology as we have defined it that has
conditioned the U.S. style of leadership. U.S. leaders adopt a slightly
Machiavellian attitude of applying ideology whenever and wherever they
can in the conduct of foreign policy, giving precedence to power when the
two cannot coexist compatibly.
70
£. Ik? "PeMg«te pajance of Terrer'
We might now apply this analysis of the roles of Ideology and
power in United States and Soviet foreign policy to the awesome nuclear
destructiveness that continues to haunt international politics. Less than
three years ago the world was exposed in the Cuban missile crisis to the
ominous threat of a direct confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Although fox the time being this threat seems to have
dissipated—there is an unmistakable movement away from a bipolar con-
71
frontation of the two superpowers— it has by no means b&en laid to rest.
How do ideology and power interact in the "balance of terror" V
The Cuban crisis will serve as our example.
At first glance it would appear that power was the determining
factor in ti>e outcome of this crisis. Both sides had destructive strength
approaching infinity. Yet Khrushchev gave way I In such a finely balanced
circumstance, the aspects to consider are the specific situation, the roles
played by the opposing nations, and the evident will and resolve of the
peoples involved.
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During any period in which the opposing powers have the capabil-
ity of causing what approaches unacceptable damage* regardless
of which one strikes first, military power becomes of secondary
importance to the demonstration of the will necessary to exercise
the power, ?2
What determines the will of the people? It is conditioned, as we
have previously noted, by ideology—but Khrushchev gave way I What does
this indicate?
in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union was
employing its typical low intensity ideological opportunism, while the U.S.
was faced with an immediate national security threat. Our national interest,
Indeed our very way of life, was at stake, determining our fierce resolve.
The Soviet Union, who would not risk suicide protecting the short-term goal
of aggression, could retreat with mere loss of prestige. The United States
had the advantage of credibility in this "clash of wills. H
W© might conclude then that its national Interest and the estimate
of U.S. will were overriding in the Soviet decision to remove the missiles,
whereas the national security threat and value structure were paramount in
the U.S. determination to resist aggression with unlimited destructive power
if necessary. This illustration serves to demonstrate that the balance of
terror is a precarious one, dependent more on complex analysis of individual
situational aspects and the disposition of the adversaries than on clear-cut
lines of ideology and power.
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The underlying assumption of this essay, as implied throughout,
is that ideology and power cannot be usefully studied outside the context
of the social and political reality within which they are rooted. With this
in mind we first defined the nature of the terms end discussed their relation-
ship to each other. Wr then analyzed their role in three disparate societal
models, emphasizing their compatibility or lack thereof with the central
characteristics of the three political systems, i.e., the extant political
formulae. Finally, we examined the foreign policies of selected states
to determine the roles of Ideology and power as viewed in the confusing
light of contemporary turmoil. These nurueioue perspectives—foreign
and domestic, liberal and totalitarian, modern and traditional, industrial-
ized and underdeveloped, and so on—have enabled us to draw conclusions
at each stage of the essay concerning the importance of Ideology and power.
It now remains to assimilate this previous Information.
The degree of modernization and industrialization of a society has
been posited as being a major determinant of the chaiactet of Us domestic
politics and hence of the ideology within the society. Basically, ideology
provides the adhesive for binding groups in the society to common goals
and paths of action. In the early transitional periods of mobilization,
those requiring extreme human sacrifice, the ideology does this by
functioning primarily as a tension-managing device, for example, demand-




V* hen the society has progressed through the upper transitional
stages of political and economic development toward modernity, the
ideology functions less in managing tension and more as a value structure*
a» it is now doing in liberal democracies and in the more industrialized
Communist states. Domestically then, ideological fervor should continue
to ^ecr^MMt in our more modern societies as vertical mobility causes
uncertainty and skepticism of ideological claims. Speculation about the
future turn of ideology in the developing nations may be premature; however,
it will increasingly reflect the growth of welfare demands along with demands
for equality and human rights. Racist overtones may reasonably be expected
to increase ideological fervor In many developing nations.
Although the Impact of Ideology is visible and important in the
field of foreign affairs, the pendulum has been swinging away from world
ideological struggles to the realities of power. Cold war tensions are not
primarily ideological or even psychological, but result from real "clashes
of interest" stemming from the simple idea of territorial expansion by one
great power into the " sphere of influence" of another great power. The role
of ideology is only en indirect one.
Pew issues at stake in the contemporary world can be formulated,
Intellectually, in ideological terms. An ideological approach, rooted in
systemic values, may be deterministic, one-dimensional, and not conducive
to an atmosphere of compromise. However, for the policymaker, the cal-
culations of relative power and national interests may likewise prove
deficient. This Infinitely flexible realist approach also depends on a
value system, one which tends to downgrade or ignore too many aspects
of the actual relations of states, particularly factors of human will, to be
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a reliable guide. Computations of relative power and estimates of
national Interest may indeed lead to unwarranted optimism that will
inevitably be shattered by the realities of today's crises in such places
as Vietnam* A synthesis appears to be in order.
What peace exists in the world today appears to be based more
on fear than on friendship* As we have reiterated, our societies are
undergoing extended, accelerated, and, in some cases, violent change.
This process of change, not ideology or even power, is the central and
ordering (or, more commonly, disordering) concept of world politics.
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